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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff -Respondent
Case No.
10234

- vs.-

LE,SLIE D. PAPPA:COSTA·S
Defendant-Appellant.

AP'PELLANT'S· BRIEF

S·TAT'E.MENT OF THE FA·C T'S
1

T·he State produced evidence that the Pehrson Hardware Store located in Salt Lake C·ounty, State of Utah,
1

was burglarized between 6 p.m. on January 6, 1964 and
8 :30 a.m. the ne!xt morning ( R-30). En try was apparently
through a hole in the roof (R-36). 'The store was found in
general disorder and disarray with empty boxes and
boxes containing various firearms strewn about (R-31).
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2
Mr. Pehrson, speaking from his records, stated that
one of the items missing was a 357 Magnum pistol, valued
at $115 (Rr-39) with the Serial No. 375-66 (R-54). He
could not testify that the particular gun was stolen (R85).
Five days thereafter the gun was taken from an automobile owned and driven by Bates Anderson (R-11) and
in which the appellant togethe-r \vith two other occupants
"\Vas riding in Las Vegas, Nevada (R--64).
At the hearing on the appellant's motion to supress,
the Las Vegas officer stated that he received information
from an anonymous source, that unknown persons w~re
changing license plates on a vehicle of the description of
the automobile in which the appellant was riding (R-12).
He observed the vehicle p·ulling into gas station and approached the vehicle while it was on private pro1)erty
(R-10). The officer asked the driver for his license and
registration and in this process observed a 22 calibre revolver in the console of the auto (R-13). Thereupon, the
officer placed the driver and occupants under arrest and
searched the auto (R-13). There ''Tas no "Tarrant for
arrest or search warrant and the search was conducted
as part of a standard procedure by the X evada police
when an auto is about to be to\Yed (R-13). The appeJlant
testified the arresting officer sa\v only son1e cartridges
in the console and while seeking the auton1obile registration ordered the driver (R-23) to open the glove compartment. When a revolver fell out, the officer dre"T his pistol
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and ordered everyone out of the car. The appellant was
arrested for investigation of certain felonies hut he was
not trie·d for any offense in Nevada (R-26).
S'TAT'EMENT OF NAT'URE O·F THE 'CASE
T'his is a criminal ap·peal from a conviction of grand
larceny rendered in the Third Judicial District Court,
S·alt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Merrill C.
Faux, p·residing.
DIS.POSITION IN LOWER ,C.OURT
T'he appellant was ·charged with Second Degree Burglary and Grand Larceny. Upon a p1ea of not guilty a
jury trial was had and a verdict rendered finding the
appellant guilty of Grand Larceny. P'rior to trial Appellant made a motion to supress and after hearing the court
denied the same.
REiLIEF SOUGH·T ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks to reverse

the~

lower court's rul-

ing denying Appellant's motion to suppress, to reverse
the conviction and to obtain a new trial.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

STIAT'EMENT OF POINT'S RELIED UPON
POINT I.
T·HE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENIT TO SUPPORT A
CONVI!CTION OF GRAND LARCENY.
POINT II.
THE CO·URT ERRED IN GIVING IN.STRU·CTION 6
AND IN FAILING T 10 GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUES'TED
INSTRU·CTION N·O. 1.
POINT III.
·COUR'T ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MO'TION
TO SUP·PRESS T'HE EVIDENCE IN THAT THE EVIDENCE
WAS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED WITHOUT SEARCH WARRAN·T, WARRANT F 0R ARREST OR SEARCH INCIDENT
1

TO AN ARREST.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
TH·E EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
CONVI CTION OF GRAND LARJCENY.
1

The conviction in the lower court was based solely
on alleged possession of a weapon, to \vit, 357 mangun1
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pistol, "\vhich apparently was from the Pehrson l-Iardware store (R-35) .. However, the owner indicated that
the gun could have been sold (R-44) and could not testify
that the gun was stolen (R-85). Officer Reed of Las
~\T egas testified that the appellant indicated that the gun
belonged to him and that he had p·urchased it from the
man in Salt Lake two months prior (R-88). Another
salient fact is that the pistol was not found on the person
of the appellant, but rather in a glove compartment of an
automobile owned by the driver Bates Anderson, in which
t'vo other occupants "\Vere present.
Under this state of facts, the law in this jurisdiction
is clear. No conviction can stand merely on bare possession
'vhen not coupled ''Tith other culpatory or incriminating
circumstances. State v. Kinsey, 77 U. 348, 295 P. 247
( 1931). Also, see cases cited therein. A later interpretation of the Kinsey case is found in St~ate v. Dyett, 114 U.
379, 199 P.2d 155 (19,48) wherein this court cited the
Kinsey case, together with State v. Barretta, 47 U. 479,
155 P. 343, for the proposition that mere association of
an accused with property recently stolen in insufficient.
The Dyett court further enunciated the proposition that
1nerely p·roving constructive possession of recently stolen
property will not sustain the burden inasmuch as it would
be pushing the role too far to require of one accused of a
crime an explanation of his possession of stolen p-roperty,
when p·ossession could, also, with equal right, be, attributable to another. The instant case clearly falls within
the framework of the court's language.
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IThe app·ellants further submits that in order that
the prima facie evidence role of recent stolen property
may become operative in a given fact situation, such
possession must be recent, personal, exclusive, and conscious. State v. Butterfield, 70 U. 529, 261 P. 804 (1927).
State v. Morris, 70 U. 570, 262 P. 107 (1927). Also,
see 32 Am Jur., see 141. There is no doubt that this rule
prevails in our jurisdiction.
An illustrative ease, setting forth the above rule is
found in Davis v. St~ate (Alaska), 369 P2d 87 (1962)
'vherein the court reversed on the grounds that the stolen
items found in a garage adjoining the accused house did
not sho'v exclusive possession. The •Court stated:
The Court further stated:
"Possession to be exclusive must be to the
exclusion of all not party to the crime."
"Mere constructive possession, as would be
the case where possession is not actual on person
is not enough."
The Alaska Court concluded that if other persons
have equal rights and facility of access with the accused
to the place 'vhere stolen goods are discovered, the possession not being exclusive or personal is of no ,veight.
'The appellant llrges that the evidence is insufficient
to establish personal, exclusive and conscious possession
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of recently stole·n property and consequently the conviction must fall.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTR,UC'TION 6
AND IN FAILING 'T'O GIVE DEFENDANT'S

REQUES~ED

INSTRUCTIO·N NO. 1.

T·he trial court instructed as follows :
You are instructed that the law of this State
includes, as part of the definition of "larceny'' the
following:
Possession of property recently stolen, when
the person in possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed p~rima facie evidence of guilt.
The term "prima facie," as used in this instruction, means at first sight or as the face of
things.
Accordingly, such evidence is presumptive
evidence, but does not mean that, unless it is rebutte·d by other evide·nce or discredited by circumstances, it becomes conclusive of the fact of
guilt.
'The ap~pellant contends that the above instruction is
insufficient as a matte-r of law in that said instruction
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does not state that possession must be personal, exclusive,
and conscious. See State v. Morris, Supra; State v. Kensey, Supra; State v. Brooks, 101 U. 584, 126 P·.2d 1044
(1942). The appellant further contends that instruction
was prejudicial to substantial rights of the appellant.
T'he p-rosecution based its entire case upon the theory
of reeent possession. No evidence vv-as introduced to connect the ~defendant at the scene of crime other than the
possession of the pistol. Possession therefore was the
crux of the state's case. Not to have submitted a proper
instruction in such circumstances deprived the defendant
of his full measure of justice to have his guilt or innocence submitted to the jury under proper legal instructions T·he purpose of an instruction is to furnish guidance to the j·ury in their deliberations and to aid them in
arriving at a proper verdict. 53 A1n. Jur., Sec. 590. An
erroneous and incomplete instruction in a n1aterial and
significant aspeet of the case \V holly falls short of this
purpose.
The term "possession" is a ter1n of art and has special meaning .depending on the context in \Yhich it is
spoken. In various areas of tlu_~ la,v, this elusive tern1
has a different and varied meaning. In larceny cases,
"possession" has been defined as exclusive, personal, and
conscious. See cases cited above. A jury of laYnlen cannot be capable of affixing the technical Ineaning of possession \vithout the guidance of the court.
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·T·he instant case can be analogized with State v.
Horne 62 U. 37·6, 220 P. 378 (19·23), wherein this court
held prejudicial error was committed when the lower
court imp·roperly defined the words "feloniously.'' The
rationale of the court was to the effect that the~ trial
court's definition was too narrow and whereas S"Uch terms
are well understood to the judges and lawyers, when used
instructions to a jury, the terms should be carefully defined. ·The trial court in this instance faile;d to give the
prop·er instruction, leaving the jury to surmise, according
to their own imagination, what facts would amount to possession in larceny cases. Had the court given the proper
instruction, the jury eould well have found that the pistol,
having been found in a glove compartment of the automobile owned by another and in which the defendant was
only one of four occup.ants, was not in the "possession''
of the defendant.
The lower court's error 1s further aggrevated by
the fact that the defendant requested an instruction which
clearly and properly defined the term "possession". (T17). A simple reading of the requested instruction as compared with the court's instruction clearly shows that no
part of the request was given, except that portion which
comes from the Utah Statute 76-38-1, (as amended 1953).
1

The trial court is obligated to properly instruct the. jury
on the law even though the requeste1d instructron is
erroneous. State v. Scott, Utah 37 P. 335· (189·4).
Howeve-r, the app·ellant does admit that the requested
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instruction was erroneous. The Court in the Seott case
set forth the prop·er role of the trial court when it state·d:
"In a criminal case, the :Court should see that
the case goes to the jury in a -clear and intelligent
manner, so that they may have a correct understanding of what it is that they are to decide and it
should state to them fully the law applicable to the
case. It is to the Court that the accused has a right
to look to see that he has a fair trial . . ."
''A jury of inexperienced laymen could hardly
be expected to app~ly the rules applicable to this
class of testimony without some assistance from
the eourt.'' (T'his case involved an erroneuos instruction with regard to circumstantial evidence.)
Another factor which should be considered is the terminology of the trial court's language ,,. .herein the court
indicated that larceny is defined as recent possession of
stolen prop·erty. Although much confusion exists, the true
rule is th~at recent possession of stolen property is merely an evidentiary fact tending to establish that. ultimate
issue of guilt or innocence, 22 Anz. Jur., 140. Also, see
101 Am. 51, Rep. 501. No \Yhere can there be found any
authority that recent possession is part of the definition
of the crime of larceny. To define larceny in the ter1ns
set forth by the trial court expands the meaning far beyond the statute and case la\v. The trial court co1npletely
ignored the precedent in our state ,,. .ith regard to this
matter. S-ee State v. Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d ~28,
( 1943), reversed 1-15 U tal1 1G:2, l-t-3 P. 2d 494 ( 1944)
1
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'vherein the court sets forth a prop.er instruction as applied to the issue raised by the appellant, to wit:
"If it is found from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that someone had committed
larceny as charged, that defendant was found
in possession of recently stolen goods and that
defendant failed to give a satisfactory exp~lana
tion, there would arise an inference that the· defendant committed larceny and that such inference might be considered in determining whether
the jury was convinced beyond reasonable doubt of
defendant's guilt."
The lower court's instruction would directly mislead
the minds of the jury, in that, the jury could find that
the appellant was in possession of recently stolen p·rop·erty without satisfactory explanation and thus find him
guilty of larceny "vithout finding that the defendant feloniously took or carried away the personal property of another. Compare court's instruction No. 5 and No. 6. This
conclusion is inescapable when one considers the fact that
the defendant was also charge·d with burglary in the
third degree and the jury faile·d to return the ve·rdict of
guilty in that count, consequently it is apparent that the
jury did not find facts sufficient to belief that the defendant entered the hardware store. IIaving not so found, the
jury could not have believed the defendant was involved
in the theft. The only fact of which the jury was appraised was possession and if possession is deemed as
part of definition of larceny the jury obviously fPlt that
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possession, of itself, was sufficient. T'his is totally prejudicial to the defendant ill that it permits a finding of guilt
of larceny on facts which are only legally deemed prima
facie evidence of guilt and flys in the face of State v.
Hall, supra. Also, see State v. Allen, 56 U. 37, 189· P. 84
(1920) wherein the definition of larceny did not include
possession of recent stolen property. The balance of the
court's instruction in no way corrects or alleviates the
trial court's error and the app·ellant submits that instruction no. 6 constitutes prejudicial error and merits
reversal.
POINT III.
·COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLAN.T'S MO'TION
TO SUP'PRESS THE EVIDENCE IN THAT THE EVIDENCE
WAS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED WITHOUT SEARCH WARRANT, WARRANT FOR ARREST OR SEARCH IN·CIDENT
TO AN

ARRE~ST.

The ap·pellant submits that the evidence produced

1

at the he·aring in app·ellant's motion to suppress indicates
that the search of the vehicle in \Yhich the appellant was
an occup-ant was without search "rarrant, arrest warrant
and without probable cause to search. The eYidence shows
that arrest was incident to the search \Yhich is in violation of the appellant's constitutional rights. Mapp v.

Ohio, 367 lT.S. 643, 6 L. ed. 1081, 81 S.C. 1684 (1961).
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At the time the occupants of the vehicle we·re approached by the Las Vegas p·olice officer, they were driving into a gas station (R-10) and from all appearances
were not violating any laws. ·The officers observed the
registered owner of the vehicle· driving. A disp,ute arose
as to what point the occupants were placed under arrest.
The officer testified that they were arrested after he observed a 22 pistol in the console (R-12) and the appellant
testified that there vvas no pistol in the console, only
cartridges and they were ordered out of the· car and held
at bay while the driver-owner opened the glove· compartment at the order of the officer whereupon the 3 pistols
fell out (R-17). It is undisputed that the search was made
purely as a matter of procedure for vehicles which are
to be towed away (~13) and not in an effort to secure
fruits of the crime, instrumentalities of the crime or for
self-protection. Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S·. 217, 4 L.Ed. 2d 668,
80 S. Ct. 683.
The search should be condemned as purely exploratory. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U.S., 282 U.S:. 344, 75 L.
Ed. 374 (1930), and U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S~. 452., S. ~Ct.
420, 76'L. Ed. 877, 82ALR775 (1g.32).
1

Looking at the evidence most favorable to the state,
one must conclude that there was no valid arrest. The
arresting officer's information that persons in an automobile of the description in which the defendant was an
occupant were exchanging license plates was not suffi-
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cient to justify an arrest since no misdemeanor was committed in his presence. UCA. 77-13-3 (1) (as amended,
1953). Nor was there any facts upon which the arresting
officer could reasonably believe that the occupants had
committed a felony. UCA. 77-13-3 (5) (as amended, 1953).
The sole reason for the search was the fact that it
was regular p~rocedure to search an automobile which was
going to he towed away (R-13). No "inherent necessity
of the situation at the time of the arrest'' existed. Trupiano v. U.S.J 339 D.'S. 669·, 92 L.Ed. 1663, 68 S. (Ct. 1229,
overruled on another point in U.S. v. Rabinowitz} 339' U.S.
56, 9'4 L. Ed. ·6·53, 70 S. ~ct. 430. A search, whether incident
to an arrest or not, cannot he justified by what turns up.
People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528.

The appellant respectfully subn1its that the lower
court erred in giving improper instruction, and in failing
to give defendant's requested instructions which "~as prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant; further
that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the verdict
of larceny and the court erred in denying defendant s
motion to suppress. For these reasons, the appellant
urges that this court reverse and remand the cause.
1

Respectfully submitted,
Jll\11 MIT,STJNAGA
Legal Defender
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